A Capped, Rebalanced Patent Sponsorship Model for a Cooperative IP Platform

Jonathan R. Jones
Founder & General Manager, Liana Banyan Corporation
February 17, 2026

Abstract

We present a patent economics model for a cooperative platform in which (1) the platform and its workers retain majority control, (2) external sponsors can underwrite patent development, (3) capital returns are generous but capped and recyclable, and (4) patent performance is pooled into dynamically rebalanced “buckets” to maintain equitable per-stake outcomes over time. The model applies to an existing portfolio of over 1,200 documented innovations, and coexists with a three-tier IP control framework used by all creators for new IP.

1. Motivation

Liana Banyan’s patent portfolio — over 1,200 documented innovations and prototypes developed across more than two decades — is treated as shared infrastructure, not a private moat. Instead of maximizing monopoly rent, the design goal is to use that IP as an “aircraft carrier” so thousands of businesses can safely launch and land on the same deck.

I’m using my IP to fund the aircraft carrier so I can fly my airplane. And so can you.

Because once the carrier is built, anyone else can fly theirs too.

We want to:

1. Keep the cooperative and its workers in primary control of the IP.
2. Let external sponsors underwrite the cost of developing and prosecuting patents.
3. Reward capital generously, but with clear, limited returns that recycle.
4. Ensure new people and new patent families get genuine “first rounds,” not crumbs.

To do this, we define a three-way split for the existing patent portfolio, and then build two carefully constrained participation mechanisms for external capital on top.

2. Top-Level Split: 60/20/20

For every license of a patent in the existing portfolio, license revenue R is divided:

The Platform’s 60% reflects the fact that the IP is meant to serve the membership and cooperative mission first.

The Founder’s 20% is structurally identical to what any creator on Liana Banyan can choose under the platform’s Three-Tier IP Control Framework — it is “just like everybody else,” not a special class of ownership. The only difference is that if Founder-created IP is derivative of internal LB IP and is used on the platform, it must respect LB’s economic rules; any external licensing can be done under separate, clearly separated contracts.

The remaining 20% — the External IP Pool — is where all external capital positions live. For the existing portfolio, we split that 20% as follows:

• 10% for a Global Sponsor Pool (Mechanism A)
• 10% for Patent Buckets (Mechanism C)

So, for any license of an existing-portfolio patent:

License Revenue R
       │
       ├── 60% → Platform (cooperative)
       ├── 20% → Founder
       └── 20% → External IP Pool
                   ├── 10% → Global Sponsor Pool (A)
                   └── 10% → Patent Buckets (C)

3. Mechanism A: Global Sponsor Pool (Diversified Exposure)

Mechanism A allows external sponsors to buy a small, diversified claim on the entire existing portfolio.

How It Works

• Sponsors purchase units in the Global Sponsor Pool up to a fixed capacity: 100% of the defined 10% slice.
• Once all units are sold for the existing portfolio, no new A-units are issued against these patents; new sponsors must purchase units from existing sponsors or participate in future IP generations.

Distribution Formula

Whenever any existing-portfolio patent is licensed for revenue Rⱼ, the A portion is:

Aⱼ = 0.10 × Rⱼ

That amount flows into the Global Sponsor Pool and is distributed pro-rata by unit. If there are N equal units and an individual sponsor holds u of them, that sponsor’s payout from this license is:

(u / N) × Aⱼ

Characteristics

Mechanism A behaves like a cooperative “index fund” over the existing patent portfolio:

• Every existing patent sends 10% of its revenue into the same pool.
• As more patents are licensed, total flow increases.
• Unit count stays fixed, so early sponsors share in all subsequent licensing activity, up to the cap rules described later.

4. Mechanism C: Patent Buckets (Concentrated, Dynamic Exposure)

Mechanism C is the channel for patent-specific funding — both internal and external — but patents are not left as isolated silos. Instead, they are grouped into Patent Buckets that are regularly rebalanced to keep per-stake outcomes across buckets roughly fair.

4.1 Who Participates?

Two instruments feed Mechanism C:

Conceptually, both are forms of capital underwriting specific patents. For economic distributions they are aggregated into a single cap table per bucket.

4.2 How Patent Buckets Work

Let the existing portfolio be patents P₁, …, Pₘ. At a given snapshot time t, we partition these patents into k(t) buckets:

{P₁, …, Pₘ} = B₁⁽ᵗ⁾ ⊔ B₂⁽ᵗ⁾ ⊔ ⋯ ⊔ Bₖ₍ₜ₎⁽ᵗ⁾

Each bucket Bᵢ⁽ᵗ⁾ has:

• A set of patents assigned to it
• A cap table of C-participants (Credits + Marks allocated to that bucket)

Between snapshots, when any patent Pⱼ in bucket Bᵢ⁽ᵗ⁾ is licensed for revenue Rᵢⱼ⁽ᵗ⁾, 10% of that revenue flows into the C pool for Bᵢ⁽ᵗ⁾. The total for the bucket in that interval is:

Cᵢ⁽ᵗ⁾ = 0.10 × Σ Rᵢⱼ⁽ᵗ⁾ (for all Pⱼ ∈ Bᵢ⁽ᵗ⁾)

That amount is paid out to bucket participants pro-rata according to their stake in that bucket.

4.3 Dynamic Re-Bucketing at Snapshots

Patent performance is uneven. Some patents will be licensed early and often; others will take decades to mature. To keep participation fair, the system uses snapshots at discrete times.

At each snapshot:

1. Measure performance:

   • For each patent, track realized licensing revenue since the last snapshot.
   • For each bucket, compute per-stake performance (revenue per unit of bucket stake).

2. Compute a new partition:

   • Choose a new grouping of patents into buckets so that per-stake performance across buckets is as close as practical.
   • The number of buckets k(t) is not fixed; it can increase or decrease.

3. Update bucket assignments and cap tables:

   • Participants’ stakes are mapped into the new bucket structure according to predefined rules.

The goal is not to guarantee identical returns, but to keep one unit of stake in any bucket in roughly the same performance band as one unit in any other bucket, over time.

This means:

• Early supporters of “slow” patents aren’t permanently disadvantaged compared to those who happened to back “fast” patents.
• Backers of a single “rocket” patent still benefit from strong performance, but some of that effect is shared across buckets at snapshot boundaries.

4.4 Snapshot Timing

The frequency of snapshots is itself a design lever:

The platform can start with an annual snapshot, measure how buckets behave, and adjust to semi-annual or quarterly snapshots for higher-activity pools if warranted. Any change in timing is applied platform-wide and logged transparently.

5. Per-Stake $10M Cap and Splitting

To prevent any capital position from becoming a perpetual rent stream, the system applies a per-stake cumulative cap.

The Cap

• Each external capital stake s (in A or C) tracks cumulative payouts P(s).
• When P(s) reaches $10,000,000, that stake is retired: it no longer participates in distributions.

This cap is high enough that:

• Early sponsors and bucket funders can earn very substantial returns.
• But no single stake can extract unbounded value from the commons.

Stake Splitting

To keep entry ticket sizes accessible as stake values grow, the model uses splitting:

Example:

• Suppose a stake was originally sold for $1,000 and is later valued at $20,000.
• At a pre-defined threshold (e.g., once value exceeds 10× par), the system may split that stake into 20 child stakes.
• Each child stake has one-twentieth of the claim.
• The cumulative payout P(s) is divided evenly among children.
• The original holder initially owns all children and can keep or sell them.

This split does not increase the overall claim on the pool; it only subdivides it.

Combined with the $10M cap:

• Very successful stakes eventually reach their cap and stop earning.
• Capacity is reopened and sold at fair value, allowing new participants in.
• Ticket sizes can be kept in a human-scale range (e.g., $1–5K), not forced into institutional territory.

6. Dual Participation: Holding Both A and C

A given participant can simultaneously:

• Hold A-stakes in the Global Sponsor Pool
• Hold C-stakes in one or more Patent Buckets

These are modeled as separate positions:

On any licensing event:

1. Compute 60/20/20, then 10/10 inside the 20, as described.
2. Distribute the A slice via the Global Sponsor cap table.
3. Distribute the C slice via the relevant bucket’s cap table.
4. Apply per-stake caps and splitting logic as needed.
5. Sum payouts per participant.

No “priority” rule is needed, because A and C are disjoint slices of the same 20%.

7. New Patents and the Three-Tier IP Control Framework

All of the above applies to the existing portfolio at the moment this model is launched.

Future patents are integrated under the existing Three-Tier IP Control Framework, which every creator on Liana Banyan uses:

The Three Tiers

The Control vs. Payoff Trade-Off

The key insight from the Three-Tier framework:

More Control = Less Money (Tier C: 75% of a smaller pie)
Less Control = More Money (Tier A: 49% of a much bigger pie)

On $1M potential revenue:

• Tier A creator earns $465,500 (49% × 95% utilization)
• Tier B creator earns $450,000 (60% × 75% utilization)
• Tier C creator earns $300,000 (75% × 40% utilization)

Tier A creator earns MORE absolute dollars despite lower % because utilization is higher.

Founder’s New IP

The Founder’s new IP is treated like any other creator’s: each new asset chooses Tier A, B, or C, with the corresponding trade-off between control and payoff.

If new patents are derivative of internal LB IP and used on the platform, they must adhere to LB’s economic rules. They can still be licensed outside the platform under separate contracts with different terms, as long as the boundaries are clear and LB’s internal usage respects its cooperative structure.

Future Patent Generations

Future patent families can:

• Be funded entirely from platform surplus.
• Or open new, generation-specific sponsor and bucket pools with their own caps and parameters, ensuring new people get fresh “first rounds” instead of everything flowing into the original pools.

8. Labor vs. Capital

Finally, the $10M cap and Patent Bucket mechanics apply only to capital stakes:

• Global Sponsor units
• Cash-based bucket stakes (Marks and similar instruments)

They do not cap labor:

• Work contributions tracked as Joules or Credits earned through effort
• Cooperative wages, patronage, and governance rights

This preserves a key cooperative principle:

Capital is welcome and rewarded, but its returns are limited and recyclable.

Labor and participation can continue to generate value as long as the member contributes and the cooperative succeeds.

9. Visual Summary

FOUNDER'S PATENT PORTFOLIO (100%)
       │
       ├── 60% → PLATFORM (cooperative owns it)
       │
       ├── 20% → FOUNDER (same as any creator can choose)
       │
       └── 20% → EXTERNAL IP POOL
                   │
                   ├── 10% → GLOBAL SPONSOR POOL (Mechanism A)
                   │         └── Diversified: slice of everything
                   │         └── Fixed capacity, pro-rata distribution
                   │         └── $10M per-stake cap
                   │
                   └── 10% → PATENT BUCKETS (Mechanism C)
                             └── Concentrated: specific patent groups
                             └── Dynamic rebalancing at snapshots
                             └── $10M per-stake cap
                             └── Stake splitting for accessibility

10. Conclusion

The Patent Sponsorship Model achieves multiple goals simultaneously:

1. Platform Primacy: 60% of economics flow to the cooperative, ensuring the membership controls its own infrastructure.

2. External Underwriting: Sponsors can fund patent development through both diversified (A) and concentrated (C) mechanisms.

3. Limited Returns: The $10M per-stake cap prevents perpetual rent-seeking while still offering substantial upside.

4. Equitable Opportunity: Dynamic rebalancing ensures that backing “slow” patents doesn’t permanently disadvantage early supporters.

5. Creator Consistency: The Founder’s position uses the same Three-Tier framework available to all creators — no special class.

6. Labor Protection: Caps apply to capital, not labor. Work always counts.

This is the foundation for a scalable, ethical, economically efficient IP cooperative that benefits all stakeholders — and treats patents as the aircraft carrier they’re meant to be: shared infrastructure that lets everyone fly.

Further Reading

• Patent Buckets FAQ — Plain-language Q&A
• Three-Tier IP Control Framework — Control vs. Payoff choices
• I Built an Aircraft Carrier to Launch My Plane — Founder’s perspective

Jonathan R. Jones is the founder and general manager of Liana Banyan Corporation, a cooperative commerce platform with sixteen permanently funded charitable initiatives. He is a U.S. ARNG veteran (Infantry 11B, Aviation 15A), FAA Commercial Rotary Wing IFR-rated helicopter pilot, father of eight, and holds a chess rating in the top half-percent worldwide. His patent portfolio includes 1,200+ documented innovations, prototypes over 23 years, with 8 definite utility patents (9 more possible) across six applications.